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In this discussion paper, aimed at promoting debate within the profession of 
Art Therapy and Art Psychotherapy, I argue that mentalization provides us 
with a narrow intellectualist account of mind and represents a poor alternative 
to thinking. I give examples of how mind might appear in everyday verbal 
exchanges, and I suggest that attending to the use of words that refer to the 
mind and thought, would enable us to see how the cultural and social was 
necessary to our thinking, both in everyday situations, and in the clinical 
space.  I then argue that art therapy in adopting the mentalization construct 
might distract practitioners from the social, cultural, material and political 
understanding that enables us to explore and critique clinical practices.  
Keywords:  Mentalize, Thinking, Art Therapy and Art Psychotherapy.  
 
“In our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as the expression of 
a queer process.  (As we think of time as a queer medium, of the mind as a 
queer kind of being.)” 
Wittgenstein, L. 1968 Para 196 p79e 
 
Introduction 
The genesis of this paper began with feelings of ‘deja-vu’ when encountering 
the word mentalize, and its derivative, mentalization, in the art therapy 
literature.  These literatures, which are mostly concerned with the work with 
Borderline Personality Disorders, did not give me sufficient explanation of 
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mentalization and it was only later, when I began to explore the hypothetical 
constructs and practices that mentalization entailed, that I remembered the 
doubts I experienced when researching clinical literatures in Autism that 
emphasised Theory of Mind (TOM).  My struggle then was to find a language 
for describing encounters in assessment settings that did not assume 
neurological abnormality and cognitive deficit, rather I wanted a language 
which could give weight to contextual pressures and the meaning of 
communicative exchanges in situ.  During this research I also became 
interested in questioning some cognitive accounts of mind, theories of mind 
that seemed narrow in their definitions of mental activity and which relied on 
hypotheses that marginalised the social and the cultural.  
 
Dictionary Definitions 
I want to give some further thought to the relationship between mentalization 
and Theory of Mind (TOM) but before I do so I want to briefly present and 
comment on dictionary definitions of the two words that appear in the title to 
this paper. 
Mental, as we know, is the adjective that indicates a relation to mind, or the 
minds activity, as in mental health, and mental ability.  Adding “ize” to mental 
turns it into a verb, so that when we use mentalize we use it to indicate that 
we are giving form to, or that we are generating, the mental in some way.  
Mentalization does appear in the 2nd edition of Oxford English Dictionary 
(1989) – where it is defined as “mental action or process” and here in Vol. IX 
we can learn that E.C. Mann in Psychological Medicine in 1883 wrote: 
“Previous to the establishment of complete delirium or delusions there may be 
traced deviations from healthy mentalization” (Oxford English Dictionary, p 
612).  
Mentalizing as we can see has its roots in psychological medicine and it 
concerns the mind, the presence or the absence of, or, as the quotation 
above suggests, an unhealthy use of mind, or use of mental powers.   
In the same dictionary mental actions and processes are subsumed under a 
much more ordinary word which is more commonly understood – thinking.  
We can find “think” on p 946 of the dictionary, here the definitions run, briefly, 
as follows: “To form in the mind…to do in the way of a mental action…to 
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exercise the mind…to reflect…to apply the mind steadily.”  I place this 
definition here because as I began to read Allen’s paper, which I review 
below, I began to wonder why think and its derivatives thinking and thought 
were being driven out of clinical discourses, or if not driven out then placed in 
a secondary position, to a word, which judging by the way it is presented to a 
lay audience, covers the same activity.   
By way of a cautionary note, in relation to dictionary definitions, I would like to 
quote Austin, J.L. 1970 who writes “what alone has meaning is the sentence” 
(p 56), and what we should be attending to here, I suggest, when we consider 
mind and thinking, is not only sentences but where and how sentences that 
relate to the mind and thinking appear in our discourses. 
 
Mentalization and Theory of Mind (TOM) 
In Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. 2004 mentalization is presented as the tool 
for understanding the particular difficulties that the person with a Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) experiences in relation to the world and others.  It 
is presented as a guide to treatment and as frame for understanding the 
individual who is diagnosed.  When describing the BPD subject environmental 
aetiology is foregrounded, and Bateman and Fonagy emphasise the 
hypothesised neurological damage contracted from “attachment disturbance” 
experienced in “brutal social environments” (p 82).  Deficits in cognitive 
functioning are then identified - in particular the “higher order cognitive 
functions that underpin interpersonal interaction” (p 109).     
 
Here, the description of problems and the call for the promotion of 
mentalization closely resembles the Theory of Mind construct developed in 
relation to Autism.  Theory of Mind (TOM) begins with the understanding that 
we respond to others on the basis that others have beliefs and desires, that 
the thoughts of others determine their behaviour.  To think about the thoughts 
of others we have to be able to “attribute independent mental states to self 
and others” – “to form mental representations” (Happe, F. 1994, p 38).   
Autistic children when presented with a false belief task, that is, a task that 
required them to assess another’s wrong belief and show how this belief 
influences speech and action, often failed to provide the right verbal response 
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to the examiner (Baron-Cohen, S. Leslie, A. M. & Frith, U. 1985).  Autism is 
regarded as a developmental disorder, and development is an important 
consideration in relation to the capacity for mentalization according to Allen, 
J.G., Bleiberg, E. and Haslam-Hopwood, T.  (2003) who argue that “persons 
with Autism do not develop the normal capacity to mentalize” (p 19).  
As can be seen Bateman and Fonagy (2004) stress the interpersonal 
difficulties that the adult with a diagnosis of BPD experiences and they 
describe patients who “create confused and confusing inaccurate 
representations of the mental states of others and themselves” (p 58) and 
they hypothesise an impairment in “interpersonal interpretative function (IIF)” 
and “reflection function (RF)”.  As in TOM the movement in representing 
subjects is through the use of hypothesised cognitive functions available to 
the normal or neurotypical population, but which are regarded as impaired 
through neurological damage in the clinical population.  
 
The TOM hypothesis in Autism has been the subject of debate and criticism.   
For example, Bruner, J. & Feldman, C. (1993) regard the TOM hypothesis as 
inadequate, concentrating on verbal responses as it does, it can only 
represent a small part of social understanding. They emphasise the cultural 
acquisition of narrative abilities, which begins early, in exchanges with the 
caregiver.  Hobson, P. (1993) stresses the recognition and response to 
emotion as central to the development of relatedness, and Trevarthen, C., 
Aitken, K., Papoudi, D. & Roberts, J., 1996 argue that more attention should 
be given to bodily expression of emotions, gestures and movements “that 
mediate communication about psychological states” (p 57).    
 
There are two strands to these criticisms of TOM.  Firstly, critiques call for 
descriptions that capture interpersonal interaction in vivo; secondly, they call 
for consideration to be given to processes that do not easily fit intellectualist 
models of mind, that is models that stress hypothesised cognitive functions 
that involve “mental representations” (Happe 1994).   
 
Like TOM, mentalization is also reliant on hypothesised “mental 
representations”.  Both TOM and mentalization are intellectualist models of 
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mind in that they emphasise the internal construction and manipulation of 
models and symbols (representations).  They present action as arising from 
propositional mental states.  So for instance, in order to respond to an other, 
we need first to form a proposition in relation to his or her thoughts or actions.  
A criticism of this view of the mind can be found in Ryle, G. 1949 (1973).   
 
Mind is not simply something done in the head, Ryle argues.  He emphasises 
that the presence of mind is disclosed in the particularity of performances.  
According to the intellectualist view, “Whenever an agent does anything 
intelligently, his act is preceded and steered by another internal act of 
considering a regulative proposition appropriate to his practical problem”  
(Ryle, G.  1949 [1973], p 31).  But whilst “The cleverness of the clown may be 
exhibited in his tripping and tumbling…as clumsy people do, except that he 
trips and tumbles on purpose and after much rehearsal… Spectators applaud 
his skill…but what they applaud is not some extra hidden performance 
executed ‘in his head’” (p 33). 
 
The intellectualist position can be interpreted as “saying that to engage in 
action one must contemplate some proposition.” (Radman, Z. 2013).  Ryle, 
when discussing arguments, suggests that we make arguments “without 
making reference to any internal formulae” – we “do not plan what to think 
before thinking it” otherwise we “would never think at all; for this planning 
would itself be unplanned.” (Ryle, G. 1949[1973], p 30 & 31).  Geertz, C. 
1993, from the anthropological perspective, argues that “thinking is primarily 
an overt act conducted in terms of the objective materials of the common 
culture” and mental processes are situated, they have their place “at the 
scholars desk or the football field, in the studio or lorry-driver’s seat…” (p 83). 
Mind then is generated spontaneously through the use of our bodies, in 
speech, and in motor actions with materials, physical social and cultural, and 
should not be reduced to hypothecating.   
 
Looking for an explanation of Mentalization 
I want now to give some thought to two papers that were placed on the 
internet for the lay reader. The first paper “What is Mentalising” (Allen, J.G. 
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2010) taken from “Mentalizing in Clinical Practice”, Allen, JG, Fonay, P. and 
Bateman, A.W. (2008) introduces and explains what mentalizing is; the 
second paper “Mentalizing as a Compass for Treatment”, which I referenced 
earlier, (Allen, J.G., Bleiberg, E. and Haslam-Hopwood, T. 2003) published by 
the Menninger Clinic, describes mentalizing in clinical practice.  I accessed 
these papers on the internet before reading the more comprehensive account 
of BPD and mentalization provided by Bateman, A.W. and Fonagy, P. 2004.  
The two internet papers struck me as particularly propagandist and they seem 
to make large claims for the mentalization construct.  What follows then is 
partly description but mostly critique.   
 
Allen begins his paper by informing us that we are mentalizing when we 
become aware of “what is going on in” our minds (Allen, J.G. 2010).   When 
we reflect on behaviour, on our own behaviour and the behaviour of others, 
and when we make reference to desires, beliefs and feelings, we are 
mentalizing.  Allen presents us with brief narratives to illustrate the moments 
when the mind, emotions and desires are called upon to explain the actions of 
others and ourselves.  He introduces ordinary language into his examples, for 
instance: “I have been feeling a lot like people have been letting me down 
lately” (p 1) and “he might feel put out.  Well, I can tolerate that” (p 2). He 
provides the reader with a list of seven situations that require mentalizing (the 
list is not intended to be exhaustive).  The list includes: “comforting a friend in 
distress”, “clearing up a misunderstanding with a friend”, “calming down a 
child who is having a tantrum”, “developing strategies to refrain from 
overeating”, “persuading an employer to give you a raise”, “proposing 
marriage”, “describing symptoms and problems to your psychiatrist” (p 2).   
Mentalizing is “common sense”, Allen says and “you mentalize naturally: most 
of the time” (p 2).  He goes on to say that mentalizing is more than empathy, it 
can be consciously performed or spontaneous, implicit and intuitive.  It is 
creative and develops best in secure attachment relationships.  Emotions can 
be mentalized – “Mentalizing emotion requires feeling and thinking about 
feeling at the same time” (p 9 Allen’s emphasis).  Allen suggests that 
“Mentalizing is like language”, it is “ innate”, it is “common sense” (p 12).  
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In the second paper (Allen, et al, 2003) mentalizing is again described as 
coming naturally and it is argued that we have a spontaneous sense of 
ourselves and others as persons who act from mental states.  It is a “basic 
human capacity” which can become impaired.  
Mentalizing is clearly ubiquitous in these descriptions and it is presented 
positively.  It allows the individual to develop a sense of self, to manage loss 
and trauma and it is proposed that psychiatric disorders are “ultimately 
determined by abilities that result from mentalizing” (p 15).  A list relating the 
positive values of mentalizing is provided and mentalizing appears as the key 
to understanding: “In sum, mentalizing, we see human reality for what it is” (p 
16).   
 
It would appear then that mentalizing has many of the attributes of what is 
commonly called “Folk Psychology”, and as “common sense” it is an everyday 
practice and covers many different kinds of mental and social activity.  Bruner, 
J. (1990) gives particular emphasis and importance to folk psychology, which 
he identifies as a cultural support (a prosthetic device) in the production of 
narrative and autobiography.  Folk psychology is a social product, it differs 
from place to place.  It has absorbed some elements from psychoanalysis and 
other psychological discourses and can be thought of as a language that 
continuously develops.   Bruner, through his explorations of folk psychology, 
emphasises the cultural achievement of mind rather than the innate capacities 
of individuals.   
 
If we reflect on the seven examples where mentalizing is present, given in the 
first paper, we see that each situation has its own particular demands, the 
development of particular competencies is required.  Comforting a friend in 
distress requires sympathy and empathetic understanding; clearing up a 
misunderstanding with a friend shifts the situation to one where a particular 
clarity of communication is needed; calming down a child might require 
confidence and ability in containing feeling; developing strategies for 
overeating requires insight in relation to one’s desires and habits; persuading 
an employer to give you a raise requires a clear understanding of your 
employers situation and disposition but also some diplomacy and powers of 
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persuasion, not to say confidence in your own capacities; proposing marriage 
requires the ability to communicate positive feeling to a loved one; in 
describing symptoms and problems to a psychiatrist I would want to be 
articulate and clear in my use of language, but I might want to lessen the 
pathological nature of my symptoms.  What I am suggesting then is that in 
these varied situations different demands are made on the individual and it 
would seem wrong to lump these situations together, to obscure their 
particularity.  Of course the situations have things in common, they involve 
social interaction, communication and thought, but they are also conditioned 
by cultural and social expectations, we do not talk to our employer in the 
same way that we talk to our lover, a psychiatrist, or a child having a tantrum.  
Furthermore it is important to remember that these situations will differ in 
different cultures, for example how a child is responded to when having a 
tantrum, how one talks to an employer is variable at a cultural level. In many 
cultural and social settings there may be no possibility of talking to an 
employer about a raise.  Further, each situation will have its own history, and 
the narratives that participants have been using to understand these 
situations and the developing relations will be critical to the thought processes 
that emerge (see Bruner, J. 1990 and Geertz, C. 1993).  We should also 
notice that these are situations where power relations are negotiated, and the 
individual is engaged in achieving a particular end.  Consequently words in 
these situations will be used in particular ways, to provide comfort, to clarify, 
to pacify, to provide solutions, to persuade, to propose and to describe and so 
on – these are important differences when we reflect on communication, the 
ascription of mental states and the understanding of others.  Important 
because our intentionality, or desire, is critical in how we see others, e.g. as 
obstructive or helpful, as deceitful or honest.    
 
After thinking about the phrases used in Allen’s narratives I felt the need to 
generate phrases of my own, phrases that I felt reflected the ways in which 
thinking and the mind can appear in ordinary conversion. Consider the 
following: 
a. “I don’t think she wants to” 
b. “I can’t think what George had in mind” 
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c. “I think she’s thinking about tomorrow” 
d. “I feel sure she is thinking about her mother” 
e. “I’m going out of my mind with worry” 
f. “His mind is not on the job” 
g. “He’s too preoccupied to listen – his mind is elsewhere”  
We can see that a. is close to the example given in the paper.  It suggests 
that some interpretation or inference has been made in relation to behaviour, 
but it also brings desire into view and a context is implied.  Phrase b. indicates 
a degree of uncertainty, and we can see from c. and d. that our sense of 
certainty can be variable in relation to thought and the other.   The spatial 
metaphor is used in b. when we say “in mind” we think of an internal space 
from which we can absent ourselves, as in e. where anxiety drives our 
thinking processes, and the mind itself can be in the wrong place as in f. 
where attention to task is in question.  We are often urged to pay attention 
and attention is significant in identification of the presence of, or absence of, 
thought.  It is part of the quality of an action or performance (see Ryle, G. 
1949 [1973]).   In g. there is an indication that thought can get in the way of 
communication, can prevent the appropriate attention from emerging – here 
there may be two minds, the desired mind that is required for listening and the 
mind that is “elsewhere”.  
 
Part of the fun of generating the phrases above was to imagine narratives in 
which they might make an appearance, to imagine situations where they 
might take on meaning.   The phrases do suggest situations where an 
explanation is demanded – see b.c.d.f. and g. – e. is a self-reflection but 
perhaps a reflection given to explain behaviour to another.   When we 
introduce the topic of thought and mind into the conversation we do it for a 
reason – we want to engage and affect our interlocutors in particular ways, in 
this sense talk of mind is not simply reporting on our thinking or our 
hypotheses in relation to the thought of others, we may be excusing others for 
instance, c.f. and g. or ourselves, e.  The meaning of talk and action are 
linked and the whole is culturally organised and interlocutors are constrained 
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by roles.  As Bruner (1990) argues mind is a creator of meanings but it both 
constitutes and is constituted by a culture.         
 
Thinking and talk about mind might be a queer process - changing 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis (Wittgenstein, 1968) – but what kind of process is 
mentalization?  It might simply be argued that it is a technical word, whose 
conceptual content enables clinicians to identify deficits in cognitive functions, 
but as it is advertised it is extremely broad in its application, and I find that I 
cannot extract from the above papers any clear boundaries in relation to the 
conceptual content.  It is presented as ubiquitous.  For example Allen, J.G. 
2008 (2010) writes: “mentalizing enables you to recognize, tolerate, regulate, 
and express your feelings of frustration…” and “all forms of therapy rests on 
mentalizing on the part of patients and their therapists” (p 9).  What if you 
removed the word mentalizing from the first section of the quotation and 
simply suggested that recognition, toleration and the regulation of feeling 
requires thought – would something have been lost?  Or in the second part of 
the quotation, if you simply removed mentalization and substituted the word 
thinking would it not still make sense, and at the same time remove a 
mystery?   Allen does concede that “There is more to life than mentalizing” 
(Allen, J.G., 2010 p 7) but it is hard to know where it begins and ends. 
 
The Appearance of Mentalization in the Art Therapy Literature 
I now want to develop my argument, and discussion, by briefly exploring some 
recent art therapy literature that responds positively to mentalization, and 
Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) (Bateman, A.W. and Fonagy, P. 2004).  
I am not presenting this as a literature review, rather I have selected a few 
papers that I think provides us with some description of how verbal 
exchanges, between the therapist and/or group and the BPD patient, are used 
to show the development of, or the presence of, mentalization in art therapy 
and art psychotherapy practices.  
 
Springham, N., Findlay, D., Woods, A. and Harris, J. 2012 researched an art 
therapy group, which was a component in a Mentalization Based Treatment 
(MBT).  As well as presenting some account of outcome through measures, 
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they present an exploration of the transcripts of repeated interviews of a 
service user.   In identifying “key themes” the authors wanted to find what was 
effective in the art therapy practice and what was harmful.   
 
Art, they argued, enabled the client to “externalise feelings”, and name the 
“image’s content” and thereby “create a language for mental content which 
supports mentalization” (p 122).  A repeated process of art making, art 
sharing which is done in turn, and “converting” thoughts and feelings into 
words is encouraged in the MBT Art Therapy groups.   
 
Springham, N.  2015, in his review of literature describing the work that art 
therapists undertake in relation to BPD, describes art making as having a 
capacity to “slow down or distance mental content”.  Art Therapists can 
address “non-thinking states”, addressing the experience in BPD of “thoughts 
being too real”, and helping with “fight/flight arousal states”.  This is achieved 
through repeated cycles of art making and art viewing. “Mind orientated 
questions about artworks stimulates joint attention” and this is also seen as 
addressing “mind-blindness” as well as difficulties with “attention control” (p 
89). 
 
Springham does not mention assessment, or variety in individual 
presentation, instead he stresses the picture of BPD as formulated in the 
literature, giving a particular weight to a “disorganised attachment style”.   He 
argues for the avoidance of “symbol interpretation” and this seems to echo his 
criticism of group analytic approaches, and other analytical practices in Art 
Psychotherapy.  There clearly is some interpretation taking place in the MBT 
Art Therapy as it is described, and the interpretation takes place through the 
use of the mentalization construct where subjects are constituted as having 
particular difficulties in relation to interpretation and reflection, that is the 
cognitive deficits identified by Bateman and Fonagy 2004 namely, 
interpersonal interpretative function (IIF) and reflection function (RF).  The 
stress in MBT Art Therapy is on the patient producing verbal associations and 
interpretations of their artwork, which confirms development in IIF and RF and 
the presence of, or beginnings of, mentalization.  
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Springham, (2015) and Springham et al, (2012), do not give much detail in 
relation to exchanges in the groups, between group members or between the 
therapist and the group, and in consequence I found it difficult to determine 
exactly what verbal responses or contributions, and what behaviours, 
constitutes evidence of the existence of, or beginnings of mentalization, and, 
of course, there could be other behaviours and exchanges that, for the 
therapist, indicates an abnormality, or a lack of thought or mentalization – this 
also involves interpretation.     
 
Michal Bat Or (2010) is also keen to demonstrate how art making promotes 
mentalization.  Bat Or, however, describes exchanges between the therapist, 
or researcher seeking evidence for the presence of mentalization, and service 
users. Research is presented where a sculpting task is given to 24 mothers of 
2-4yr olds. The task involved the mothers in sculpting themselves with their 
child in clay.  The production of the sculpture was recorded on video and the 
mothers were afterwards interviewed in the presence of their work.  The 
author writes: “Mentalization was detected through analysing sculpting 
processes and through the sculpting interviews.” (p 321).  
 
Some edited transcript material is given in the paper, which I have reproduced 
here in part. The researcher points to a sculpture and asks about a circular 
base with a rim from which the sculptured mother and child figures emerge. 
Therapist:  “and something like this, like, a container, here (yes), I wanted to 
ask if you can tell me something about it?”   
Ayala, the mother concerned, responds: “while I sculpted I didn’t know what 
would it be………. I did not want to do legs, because legs end, they have an 
end…. so I said to myself o.k., I’ll sculpt the sh, the shape, then I will see what 
it will be……. It really looks like, a sea, huge reservoir like the sea, then uh, 
it’s like every time, to throw him into the water step by step.…. as you can 
see, the legs are already in, I believe at some point, he will want his 
independence too, and it will be, but always the embrace will remain open… ” 
(p 322)    
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This response is interpreted by the author/researcher as representing Ayala’s 
“wish for a prolonged relationship” with her child, “despite his development.”  
The claim is then made that the “irregular image triggered mentalization with 
the agency of the interviewer.” (p 322). 
 
Why is the making, and the encounter with an audience, seen as an example 
of the triggering of mentalization?  The transcript suggests that thinking takes 
place throughout the making and in the interview – I see no evidence of the 
absence of mind here. Ayala speaks about that part of the sculpture that the 
audience (the therapist/researcher) has responded to.   She reflects on her 
experiences with the material to give an account of why the sculpture looks as 
it does, and when she produces her associations she speaks poetically, for 
example, in speaking about the sea, the reservoir and water, and she 
enlarges on these poetic images when she links this to her “embrace always 
being open”.  These associations could be interpreted in many different ways.  
They clearly relate to her experiences of being with her child, and how she 
wants to present herself as a mother.  Her comments are understood as the 
expression of a “wish for a prolonged relationship” with her son “despite his 
development”. The interpretation is not intended critically, and Ayala is clearly 
thinking about her child’s development, when she says “step by step” and her 
“always” suggests being available over time.  But Ayala, doesn’t mention 
“development” and in this extract she does not make use of the therapist’s 
word “container”, rather what she feels she has presented is “huge” like the 
“sea”.   
 
In suggesting that the process of sculpting and subsequent response to the 
interviewer constitutes, or creates mentalization, is to say that the Reflective 
Function (RF) was present and “parental mentalization” had been promoted. 
The researcher is in need of showing that the art making has a value, that is, 
that the art making and talking promotes a particular kind of thinking, or verbal 
expression, that can be subsumed under the mentalization hypothesis, but 
what stops us describing this encounter with the clay and the researcher in 
other words, words that are more readily understood in relation to feeling, 
thinking, reflection and the use of hands?  
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Bat Or does begin an interesting discussion on how the sculpting process 
elicits “wondering” as the “mothers’ hands told something that was 
inconsistent with their self-knowledge” (p 325) and this is identified as a 
trigger for mentalization.  Bat Or then directs the readers’ attention to the 
further evidence of the subsequent verbal interpretation which is seen as 
representing the “integration of previously denied and irreconcilable aspects 
of the self” (p 325).  New experiences do promote thinking, as well as verbal 
expression, but I would want to say that the use of the hands is thinking in 
action, and experiencing oneself as different does not necessarily indicate a 
relationship to the irreconcilable.   
 
Franks, M and Whitaker, R. 2007 give an account of an art therapy group that 
was offered to BPD patients as part of a treatment programme that included 
individual psychotherapy. “Image”, the authors argue, “becomes central in the 
mentalization process” enabling “clients to observe their sense of self 
emerging, along with others perceiving them as thinking and feeling”(p 4).  
In the first session of the group “Sam” produces an abstract composition, 
which contains a series of Z or possibly N like markings.  Sam shared a 
concern with the group that “her ‘real voice’” might not be heard “above the 
voice of the medication prescribed for her depression”.  “Archie” another 
member of the group, asked if her picture “described her feeling of being put 
‘to sleep’ by her illness”.  Sam, we are told, “appeared astonished and 
relieved” by this (p 8).  Franks and Whitaker point out that Archie’s 
mentalization is apparent in this exchange and his interpretation “confirms that 
Sam is reachable” (p 8).  
 
The authors then describe the ways in which particular techniques with the 
pastels, colour and style are shared amongst the members of the group and 
this “unspoken visual communication” apparent in the images is seen as 
“mirroring” and “very significant in terms of evidence of mentalising”(p 12). 
These exchanges, as they have been described, confirm that the group is 
working well and that communication arises naturally from the sharing of art 
materials and products, and that thinking takes place through the making, 
looking and exchanging of associations and interpretations.  This positive 
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account of the value of group work seems standard in many ways, what I find 
difficult here, is to appreciate what value the use of the mentalization 
construct adds.  I did also think that the stress on the attainment of 
mentalization prevents further explorations, for example of the group dynamic, 
the relations between the images and the relation between the themes 
explored.  Here I feel left with the question: is mentalization there because 
institutional practices and clinical discourses require it?  
 
An interesting paper which explores thinking and mentalization through the 
presentation of case work has been provided by Havsteen-Franklin and 
Altamirano 2015.  The authors want to bring object relations theory and 
mentalizing together in their exploration of the therapist’s “in-session 
interventions” (p 54).  In particular they are advocating “responsive art 
making” an “attuned visual response” arising from the experience of being in 
the room with the patient.   
 
“Ms R’s experience of herself in relation to the therapist had a non-mentalizing 
nature.”(p 60) – the authors comment, and, using the language and 
formulation given by Fonagy and Bateman 2014, they write: she had 
experienced a failure in the “development of secure attachment” and this left 
her “with a deficit” in her “capacity for mentalization”. Drawing on Bion (1962) 
it is suggested that she experienced absence as “the presence of something 
bad” (p 60).  In consequence of this she was “violent” towards others in the 
session and identified the therapist as “her persecutor”. However, the 
therapist was able to provide some holding (“Bion’s alpha function”) in this 
way Ms R’s “internal experiences” could be “later named by the therapist” (p 
60).   
 
The authors indicate that this movement from the experience of absence to 
the development of thought was facilitated by the careful presentation of 
materials through non-verbal and verbal communication (“being very 
concrete”) and developing joint attention.  Detail is sensitively given in the 
description so that we can see clearly the therapist’s interventions and Ms R 
gain confidence and trust in the situation.  But instead of staying with Bion and 
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the psychoanalytical frame the authors suggest that particular elements or 
moments in the work should be translated as contributing towards the 
“capacity to mentalize”, or the “foundations for mentalizing”.  When the patient 
is able to distinguish reality from phantasy, for example, this is translated as 
“a vital component of her capacity to mentalize”(p 61); and later towards the 
end of the paper when thinking about “non-verbal dialogue” the “art response” 
itself is seen as creating “the foundations for mentalizing” (p 63).   
 
Here, we can see that the therapists are responding to a particular difficulty 
presented by their patient, who has experienced considerable trauma.  She 
has difficulty in managing her anxiety in the situation, in relating to the 
therapists and to the art materials, and in making use of them in a way that 
enabled her thought processes to develop.  Two discourses are used to 
understand the patient’s thinking in this paper, psychoanalytical approaches 
to thinking, and the mentalization discourse.  In Bion’s account of thinking 
thought and emotion are indivisible.  Bion’s model also stresses the 
importance of relation to an other in the development of thought and mind.  
Whereas whilst mentalization recognises the importance of others and of 
emotion, emotion and thought remain separated through the emphasis on the 
development of interpretation and reflection (IIF and RF); cognitive functions, 
both of which appear to be evidenced through the translation of experiences 
into a verbal form, something which the therapist in this vignette does in part, 
for the patient.  What is not fully explored here is the capacity of art making, 
through material engagements and the use of the hands, to bring other 
subject positions into the orbit of the patient’s experience.  More could also be 
explored in this paper, I felt, in relation to the therapists use of, and 
engagement with, the art materials.  What does this intervention bring into 
view for the therapists?   It may shift pressures in particular ways, away from 
the clinical practices that look for verbal confirmation of a particular 
psychopathology – albeit briefly – but what does the therapist then 
experience, in relation to his own making and hand use?  So again I would 
want to question whether the conceptual apparatus of mentalization provides 
any added value in increasing understanding of the practices of art therapy or 
of the developing subjectivity of patients and therapists in the art therapy 
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setting.  Bion’s model seems entirely suitable for understanding the process, 
as described, for the moderation of catastrophic anxiety, and the promotion of 
exploratory thought, and it works without the hypothesised impaired cognitive 
function.    
 
Fonagy, P. 2012 writes that “art therapy has served a complex and varied 
client group arguably better than any other single modality.” He suggests that 
art therapy is not “overburdened” with “over-detailed theorising” and that it is 
close to the “embodied roots of human consciousness”, but he wants to align 
art therapy to “the canons of 21st-century science” (p 90).   Being part of a 
“21st- century science” might be attractive to art therapists but the danger is in 
adopting mentalization, a cognitive and neurological orientated approach to 
art psychotherapy or art therapy, which reduces thinking to hypothesised 
cognitive functions, we are likely to neglect the embodied and extended, 
material and culturally conditioned aspects of mind, and thinking, that enables 
art therapy to be effective.  Further, Springham’s (2015) construction of 
practices that can be operationalised, that is, reproduced in order to meet 
diagnostic prognosis and thereby replicate the diagnostic description of 
subjects, is likely to rob the practice of its flexibility and responsiveness to 
clients, to desire, situation and need.  
 
Alternative Practices in Art Psychotherapy with BPD patients 
Is it possible for an art therapy service to provide a space for both patients 
and therapists to challenge clinical discourses as well as explore interpersonal 
understanding?  Well, Eastwood, C. 2012 presents work in groups with BPD 
patients and the descriptions are similar to those provided by Frank and 
Whittaker above, in that Eastwood provides a good picture of individuals 
making use of art making and the group experience to explore making and 
associations, and develop awareness and insight. Eastwood approaches BPD 
from a feminist perspective and she, unlike the art therapists so far 
considered, is willing to critique clinical discourses from a political position. 
The BPD diagnosis, she points out, was constructed from “patriarchal bias” 
and it does not recognise that good mothering is a social construct and that 
“the quality of mothering is far from being the whole story of development”(p 
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100). In relation to treatment Eastwood suggests that “the great difficulty 
faced by the team” in treating the BPD patients, is “in acknowledging the 
degree of abuse experienced by patients”, further if “symptoms are 
understood in terms of a response to trauma and not pathology” they “can feel 
all the more distressing to encounter” (p 107).   
 
Words 
So far this paper has been mostly preoccupied with words, with the meaning 
and the use of words in particular situations.  The art therapists that adopt the 
mentalization approach do have a desire for words that can confirm the 
presence of mentalization.  I did briefly, when discussing the paper by 
Havsteen-Franklin and Altamirano 2015 comment on this, but to be fair to 
them they do give attention to art making.  They illustrate the work and 
describe the processes involved in the making.  But suppose we do not 
regard art making as necessarily an expression related to a “core self” or as 
externalizing some “inner” content of the mind, as does Bat Or and Havsteen-
Franklin and Atamarino, and instead try to think about the work as arising 
from a situation, where authorship is diluted, for example where the therapist 
plays a role in the introduction of the material and its use, where there is an 
audience, the therapist and the group, where expectations shape the 
individual’s engagements with art materials and shape intentionality.  We can 
see this in the description of an art therapy group provided by Franks and 
Whitaker (2007) and in Eastwood (2012), but also in Bat Or’s (2010) 
experiments.  Art making, the engagement of the hands in the use of 
materials is socially organised in art psychotherapy and art therapy, and art 
making itself shapes thought through the generation of experiences, some 
intentionality maybe present at the beginning, but this shifts and is identified 
later in verbal and social exchanges with an audience, and this retrospective 
identification of intentionality is subject to change.  In this process, self and 
identity are performed and explored and subjectivity is experienced as mobile.  
 
Subjects and Subjectivity  
Clinical discourses, which includes the setting and practices within the setting, 
as well as the production of literatures and statements, are described by 
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Foucault as “dividing practices” (Foucault, M. 1994 [2000]).  Engaged as they 
are, in the normalisation of individuals, they constitute subjects, patients or 
service users, and therapists or clinicians, in particular objective formations.  
Mentalization, through its description of the BPD subject, and its confirmation 
of abnormal thought processes, exemplifies this formation of subjects and the 
power relations that discursive practices produce. Therapists, clinicians and 
patients are subject-to these objectifications and they are engaged in finding 
meaning in “illness definition” (see Terkelsen, T. B. 2009), but are also seen 
as contesting classifications and bio-medical explanations.  In this sense the 
subject cannot simply be “read off” directly from the clinical literatures as 
subjects are often challenging the power relation that practices create. 
Foucault, in fact, argues that disciplinary processes, which are aimed at the 
production of the normal individual, are always productive of resistance. I 
have tried to illustrate this process, in relation to developmental discourses in 
art therapy assessments, whereby subjects assume a subjective position, 
become subject to discursive formations, but also contest that process and 
identity (see Tipple, R. A. 2003 and Tipple, R. A.  2014). 
 
Hegel sees “The subject or bearer of psychological states and processes, the 
human subject…”  as a “performer of actions and activities” where the subject 
is manifest “in a variety of states and activities, both psychological…and 
physical” and subjectivity is  “the rational subject’s reclamation of its external 
objectifications.” (See Inwood, M. 1992 p 280 & 283).  Butler, J. 1999 stresses 
that, “the Hegelian subject is not a self-identical subject who travels smugly 
from one ontological place to another; it is its travels, and is every place in 
which finds itself.” (p 8 author’s emphasis).  We might regard subjectivity, 
therefore, as the shorthand for that experience of being a particular subject for 
others and as the Butler quote above implies we, as subjects, are always 
responding to a situation, engaged in the processes of becoming, and 
responding to others and the material and the discursive world in which our 








I shall now try to summarise my thinking and try to consider where I have got 
to. I suggested that hypotheses which posit cognitive functions and 
neurological damage to explain psychopathology, for example Theory of 
Mind, which has been linked to mentalization, were open to criticism because 
they adopt a narrow intellectualist view of the mind and ignore the embedded, 
cultural and extended nature of thinking. In my response, or reaction, you may 
say, I have tried to present an alternative view of mind. In thinking about 
thinking and mind I stressed the importance of understanding situations and in 
attending to the use of words. Here, I wanted to imply that misunderstanding 
and difference in interpretative activity is normative in our encounters with 
others and does not necessarily indicate an abnormal neurology or an 
impaired cognitive function.  When I reviewed some of the Art Psychotherapy 
literature I hung on to my feeling that mentalization did not seem to add much 
of value in creating understanding and I wanted to emphasise how art making, 
the use of hands in interaction with materials, brings fresh subjective 
experiences into being, and this activity itself constitutes thinking.   
 
Thought, I propose, is embedded and generated in and through the material, 
and in relation to cultural practices. I would argue, then, that intellectualist 
accounts of mind that stress cognitive functions reduce our capacity, as art 
psychotherapists, to explore the creation of mind and meaning, to understand 
the social nature of subjectivity, and to critique and contest the power 
relations that discursive practices, for example practices in mental health 
services, reproduce.    
 
In his research, Springham, 2015 is motivated towards the preparation of art 
therapy for inclusion in Randomised Controlled Trials.   He is keen to address 
“power relations” and does make effort to seek out “service users” and elicit 
their views on art therapy as a treatment.  But he clearly does present himself 
as an “expert” if not in relation to the “unconscious” of the other, then in the 
symptomology of BPD as defined in clinical literatures, and as an expert in 
what facilitates mentalization.  However, he doesn’t raise any criticism of the 
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clinical discourses, or MBT practices, or suggest that they themselves may 
embody power relations.  
 
This paper is intended to instigate debate by questioning the value of the 
mentalization construct by proposing that there may be other more fruitful and 
open ways of exploring mind and thinking in the art psychotherapy setting. 
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